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The Fourth Amendment of our Constitution provides a safeguard for U.S. citizens against 
government intrusion by barring “unreasonable searches and seizures.”1  The Supreme Court, 
however, has faced significant difficulty in consistently determining what government actions 
are “unreasonable” and what actions constitute a “search” or “seizure.”  The Court’s enduring 
problems have led several legal scholars to criticize the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence as “famously zigzagging,”2 and creating a legal framework that is riddled with 
inconsistency and incoherence.3  As a result, many in the legal community have acknowledged 
that Fourth Amendment doctrine is in a state of theoretical chaos.4  This is especially true 
regarding the Court's approach to Internet surveillance.  An analysis of the Fourth Amendment 
doctrine over the years leads to the inevitable conclusion that case law and federal legislation are 
currently ill-equipped to address Internet privacy rights. 
 
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Fourth Amendment played a minor 
role in search and seizure cases.5  One of the Court’s earliest decisions held that the “contents” of 
letters and sealed packages were “fully guarded from examination and inspection, except as to 
their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the parties forwarding them in their 
domiciles.”6   What limited role it did play early on, the Supreme Court's early Fourth 
Amendment doctrine strictly construed the amendment to protect only against the government's 
                                                 
1 U.S. Constitution (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”). 
2 David A. Sklansky, Back to the Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, 72 Miss. L.J. 143, 143 (2002). 
3 Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. Rev. 1511, 1511 (2010). 
4 Id at 1512. 
5 Colin Shaff, Is the Court Allergic to Katz? Problems Posed by New Methods of Electronic Surveillance to the 
"Reasonable-Expectation-of-Privacy" Test, 23 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 409, 414 (2014) 
6 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 728 (1877). 
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physical trespasses onto a citizen's property, the warrantless search of tangible personal property, 
or the warrantless seizure of the person.7  The National Prohibition Act of 1919, however, led to 
an exponential increase in the number of federal prosecutions.8  Consequently, the resulting use 
of telephone wiretaps by federal investigators led to constitutional challenges to federal searches.  
United States v Olmstead epitomizes the Supreme Court's early Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 9  In Olmstead, the defendant Roy Olmstead sought to suppress, as a 
constitutionally impermissible search, recordings of conversations obtained by the police after a 
lengthy months-long wiretap of his home and office telephone lines.10  The Court held that the 
Fourth Amendment's guarantee of a right to be secure in one's “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects” only provided protection against searches and seizures of “tangible things.”11  Under this 
rationale, the Court found that a wiretap was not a Fourth Amendment search so long as the 
government did not “physically penetrate the houses or offices of the defendants” in placing the 
wiretap.12  Consequently, the majority concluded that the wiretap was not a search under the 
Fourth Amendment for two primary reasons: 1) there was no physical invasion of a 
constitutionally protected area as there was no physical trespass onto Olmstead's real property 
and 2) there was no search of a tangible item as the wiretap searched only intangible sound.13 
 
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis cautioned the Court in Olmstead that it was their duty to 
develop and adapt the Fourth Amendment in such a way as to guard against, not only means of 
                                                 
7 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465 (1928) 
8 Id. at 466 
9 Amanda Yellon, The Fourth Amendment's New Frontier: Judicial Reasoning Applying the Fourth Amendment to 
Electronic Communications, 4 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 411, 415 (2009) 
10 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455 
11 Id. At 464 
12 Id. at 466 
13 Id.at 464 
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government intrusion then known, but also “what may be” in the future.14  Brandeis further 
predicted that the technology of government intrusion into the private lives of its citizens would 
not stop with the advent of wiretapping,15 but would extend to “the most intimate occurrences of 
the home” without even “removing papers from secret drawers.16  
Justice’s Brandeis’ “right to be let alone” philosophy in Olmstead did not immediately 
catch on.17  Over the next four decades, the Court continued to adhere to its physical intrusion 
requirement enunciated in Olmstead.  For instance, in Goldman vs United States, the Court held 
that the government did not trigger Fourth Amendment coverage by placing a listening device 
against an outer wall of a building and listening to private conversations within.18  The Court 
continued to rely on Olmstead in Silverman v United States and Clinton v Virginia.  In both of 
those holdings, the Court reasoned that physical intrusion by the government was required for a 
petitioner to seek Fourth Amendment protection.19  It was becoming clear, however, that the 
Court’s physical trespass-based test was being manipulated by the government’s new and 
innovative wiretapping techniques.  In Clinton v Virginia, for example, the government attached 
a listening device using means that merely causing a thumbtack sized penetration in a wall.  
Olmstead’s rule barely survived in that case, but the Court did conclude that the minuscule 
physical intrusion constituted a “search” within a meaning of the Fourth Amendment.20 
                                                 
14 Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
15 Yellon, 4 J. Bus. & Tech. L at 415 
16 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
17 “The makers of our Constitution ... conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
18 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942) 
19 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) 
20 Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) 
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With it becoming easier for the Government to listen in on conversations without 
physically trespassing onto a person’s property, the Court and the legal community were 
becoming concerned that nothing would soon be left of Fourth Amendment protection.  A new 
privacy test was needed.  In response to that need, the Court brought vitality back to the Fourth 
Amendment in the revolutionary case of Katz v United States.  
 
In Katz, the government was permitted at trial, over Katz’s objection, to introduce 
evidence of Katz’s telephone calls overheard by FBI agents.  Specifically, the FBI had attached a 
bug to the outside of a public phone booth from which Katz made his calls.  The Court of 
Appeals, relying on the Olmstead trespass-based rule, affirmed the lower court ruling.  On 
appeal, however, the Supreme Court reversed and found that the FBI’s bugging of the outside of 
a phone booth constituted an unlawful search, thereby violating Katz’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.  The Court held that, through their warrantless search, the FBI violated “the privacy upon 
which defendant [Katz] justifiably relied.”21  Justice Stewart, in delivering the majority opinion, 
stated that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places.”22  The Court opined that what a 
person seeks to preserve as private, regardless of his location, may be constitutionally protected 
under the Fourth Amendment.  By expanding the scope of the amendment, the Court departed 
from the limiting and narrow view of Olmstead.23 
Justice Harlan, in his concurrence in Olmstead, elaborated on the Court’s new Fourth 
Amendment privacy standard.  He explained that the phone booth in Katz was “an area where, 
                                                 
21 Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
22 Id. at 350. 
23 “Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.” Id. at 
353 (Stewart for majority) 
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like a home, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.”24 
Harlan commented that, in addition to a physical intrusion by the government, an “electronic” 
intrusion could also constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.25  In establishing an 
expectation of privacy threshold test, Harlan explained that for a person like Katz to seek Fourth 
Amendment protection, he has the burden of satisfying a “twofold requirement.”26  Specifically, 
for a person to show that the government violated his/her Fourth Amendment rights, that person 
must, one, exhibit an subjective expectation of privacy (e.g. he seeks to preserve something as 
private), and two, that person’s subjective expectation, viewed objectively, is justifiable under 
the circumstances.27  Therefore, if both prongs of Harlan’s test are satisfied, then under Katz, a 
person has Fourth Amendment protection and any invasion of that constitutionally protected area 
is presumptively unreasonable in the absence of a search warrant.28 
 
Through its holding in Katz, the Court attempted to bring Fourth Amendment law into the 
world of new technologies by introducing the reasonable expectation of privacy test.29  The 
decision provided a long awaited opportunity for the Court to broaden Fourth Amendment 
protection.  Many descendant cases followed whose task was to develop, refine, and delimit the 
boundaries of the privacy doctrine of Katz.  One such case was Smith v Maryland30, through 
which Justice Harlan’s expectation of privacy test was applied and, in turn, explained more 
precisely. 
                                                 
24 Id. at 360. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 361. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 531, 585 (2005) 
30 Smith v Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
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In Smith v Maryland, a harassment case, a woman reported to the police that not only was 
she robbed by Smith, but was also receiving threatening phone calls from him thereafter.  As part 
of their investigation, the police installed a device (“pen register”) at a telephone company’s 
central office to intercept the phone numbers dialed by Smith in an effort to determine if he was 
in fact calling the complainant.  As a result of utilizing the pen register, the police did find that 
Smith made phone calls to the complainant and subsequently arrested him.  Smith was later 
convicted. After multiple appeals, the Supreme Court set out to determine whether the 
government, like in Katz, infringed on Smith’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  Using 
Harlan’s twofold test, the Court held that the use of the pen register did not constitute a “search” 
under the Fourth Amendment.31 
The Smith Court concluded that, given the limited capabilities of the pen register (i.e. 
only discloses phone numbers dialed and not conversations), Smith’s claim that he had a 
legitimate expectation of privacy must be rejected.32  Implementing Harlan’s test, the Court 
found that people do not subjectively have any subjective expectation of privacy in the phone 
numbers that they dial.  Moreover, the Court deemed that society would also not objectively find 
that an expectation of privacy in dialing phone numbers to be a reasonable one.33 
Likening the pen register as a modern day equivalent to the early day switchboard 
operator, the Smith Court relied on the concept of third-party doctrine in justifying their holding.  
As Justice Blackmun commented, the Court has “consistently held that a person has no 
legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third-parties.”34  
Applying that principle in Smith, the Court determined that when people, like Smith, whom 
                                                 
31 Id. at 746. 
32 Id. at 742. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 744. 
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voluntarily convey information to third parties, like a communications company, they expose 
that information to the company’s equipment.  As a result, people like Smith must assume the 
risk that the communications company could reveal that information to law enforcement.35  
Opposing the majority’s view in Smith, Justice Stewart believed that the use of the pen 
register constituted a warrantless search.  Relying on Katz, his dissent hinged on the presumption 
the numbers dialed from a private telephone are the same as the conversations that occur during a 
phone call, and therefore are within Fourth Amendment protection.36  Justice Stewart opined that 
the phone numbers, while mundane in comparison to an actual telephone conversation, still 
contain “content” that requires constitutional safeguards.37  In explaining his position, Stewart 
doubted that people would be alright with the list of the phone numbers they dialed being 
“broadcast to the world” because such a list could reveal the “identities of the persons and the 
places called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person’s life.”38 
Justice Marshall also dissented in Smith and, like Justice Stewart, applied Harlan’s 
privacy test in concluding that a legitimate expectation of privacy did exist in the dialing of 
phone numbers.  Marshall commented that the majority erred in applying Katz and the third party 
doctrine to the facts of the case.39  Focusing on third party doctrine, Marshall opined that a 
person is incapable of assuming the risk of disclosure by third parties to the government when no 
realistic alternatives exist.  Specifically, Marshall commented that “implicit in the concept of 
assumption of risk is the notion of choice.”40  Without having the option of choice, therefore, 
                                                 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 747. 
37 Id. at 748. 
38 Id. 
39 “The crux of the Court's holding, however, is that whatever expectation of privacy petitioner may in fact have 
entertained regarding his calls, it is not one “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’.”  In so ruling, the 
Court determines that individuals who convey information to third parties have “assumed the risk” of disclosure to 
the government.  This analysis is misconceived…” Id. at 478 (Marshall, T., dissenting). 
40 Id. at 749.  
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there can be no risk.  So, applied to the facts in Smith, unless the defendant unrealistically chose 
not to use the phone altogether, he had no choice but to accept the risk of government 
surveillance.41   
Justice Marshall called upon the Court to base the Katz expectation of privacy analysis, 
not on one’s assumption of risk of disclosing to third parties but rather, on the risks one should 
be forced to assume in a free society.42  Based on that perspective, and considering the crucial 
role telephonic calls plays in our day to day lives, Marshall concluded that the expectation of 
privacy test was satisfied and the government could not obtain the list of phone numbers absent a 
warrant based on probable cause.43  Despite its conflicting views, the Court in Smith seemed to 
be making headway in applying Katz’s expectation of privacy test to advancing methods of 
electronic surveillance. 
  In 2001, the Court again addressed the interplay of advancing technology and privacy in 
Kyllo v United States.44  In Kyllo, the government suspected a person, through the use of high 
intensity heat lamps, was growing marijuana in his home.45  To confirm its suspicion, the 
government positioned itself across the street from the suspect’s home and, by using a thermal 
imaging device, determined that the suspect’s garage was “relatively hot” compared to the rest of 
the house.46  Based on the thermal imaging results, the government obtained a search warrant 
and found 100 plants growing inside the suspect’s home.47  The case was ultimately brought up 
to the Supreme Court to address the intrusiveness of the thermal imaging device and whether the 
government’s use of that technology constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 750. 
43 Id. at 751. 
44 Kyllo v United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
45 Id. at 27. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 30. 
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Kyllo presented the Court with an opportunity to determine the limits on the “power of 
technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.48  Justice Scalia began the majority 
opinion by underscoring a key point, stating, “It would be foolish to contend that the degree of 
privacy secured by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of 
technology.”49  Reiterating Harlan’s expectation of privacy standard from Katz, the Court found 
that government’s use of the thermal imaging technology violated the suspect’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.  In response to concerns about future technological development, the Court 
established a “bright-line” rule regarding government surveillance that was “not in public use.”  
Scalia elaborated on this rule stating, “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information 
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area…constitutes a search - at least where the 
technology in question is not in general public use.”   
The majority opinion in Kyllo highlighted the Court’s concern about technological 
development and its reluctance to open the door to certain types of warrantless searches.  In the 
end, the decision constituted a successful adaptation of the Katz approach to the digital world.  
As Scalia commented, “reversing that approach (Katz) would leave the homeowner at the mercy 
of advancing technology.”50  In Kyllo, the Court made a clear step forward in Fourth Amendment 
law.  It relied on the expectation of privacy rules of Katz and adapted those rules to “more 
sophisticated systems” of surveillance.51  However, about ten years later, the Court would take a 
                                                 
48 Id. at 34. 
49 Id. at 34. 
50 Id at 28. 
51 Id. at 36. 
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step in a direct direction in Fourth Amendment doctrine.  In Jones v United States,52  the Court 
shied away from the Katz standard and proceeded down a different privacy road. 
 
In Jones, the Court unanimously concluded that law enforcement installing a GPS 
tracking device on the underside of a criminal suspect’s car did qualify as a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment.  However, the Court was sharply divided as to why it was a search.  Many 
in the legal community assumed that the Court would continue to apply the Katz expectation of 
privacy test to determine if the four-week long GPS tracking by police constituted a search.  
Switching course in its Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court surprisingly reverted back to the 
archaic trespass doctrine from Olmstead.  According to the majority, by installing the GPS 
device, there was a physical intrusion of private property for the purposes of obtaining 
information.53  Due to the physical intrusion, the Court chose to bypass the Katz standard and 
utilize the narrow, and all but abandoned, physical trespass standard.  Justice Scalia explained 
that the trespass test was the more appropriate test for the facts in Jones, and moreover, that 
Jones’ rights should not solely depend on whether he reasonably believed his privacy was 
violated.54 
A key question resulting from the Jones decision was why Justice Scalia used the 
Olmstead trespass test over the Katz expectation of privacy test.  In explaining why the Court 
switched back to the Olmstead test, Justice Scalia commented that the “Katz reasonable-
                                                 
52 United States v Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) 
53 Id. at 946. 
54 The Government contends that the Harlan standard shows that no search occurred here, since Jones 
had no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the area of the Jeep accessed by Government agents 
(its underbody) and in the locations of the Jeep on the public roads, which were visible to all. But 
we need not address the Government’s contentions, because Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do 
not rise or fall with the Katz formulation. At bottom, we must “assur[e] preservation of that degree 
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.” Id. at 950. 
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expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law 
trespassory test.”55  However, that comment, squarely conflicted with Justice Stewart’s 
comments in Katz.56  So, the question remains as to why Justice Scalia based the Court’s 
decision on a supposedly abandoned privacy test. One can only speculate, but perhaps with the 
country’s pervasive use and reliance on technology to communicate, Scalia may have felt 
society’s expectation of privacy was eroding.  Perhaps, with social media taking over the way 
people interact, Scalia was concerned what privacy rights people now considered to be 
“reasonable.”  Along these lines, Scalia may have feared that the Katz test could no longer offer 
Fourth Amendment protection.  As a result, Scalia may have felt that the trespass doctrine of 
Olmstead was needed to come back into the fray to help bolster the amendment.  Whatever 
Scalia’s motivation, it is abundantly clear today that technology is going to eclipse the narrow 
holding in Jones as law enforcement can use methods such as OnStar or cell phone based GPS to 
track people, without needing to make any physical contact with a car.57  Additionally, the 
government can surveil people in other ways, including by monitoring Web traffic or phone or 
credit card records.  
The concurrence in Jones disagreed with Scalia’s rationale and opined that the Court’s 
reliance on the trespass doctrine was unwise.  Justice Alito, for example, concurred in the 
majority's judgment but based his analysis on the Katz privacy test.  Accordingly, Alito 
categorized the issue in Jones not as an invasion of property, as Justice Scalia had, but as an 
invasion of privacy.58   
                                                 
55 Id. at 947. 
56 “Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and without 
the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow 
view on which that decision rested.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
57 The Honorable M. Margaret McKeown, The Internet and the Constitution: A Selective Retrospective, 9 Wash. J.L. 
Tech. & Arts 135, 166 (2014). 
58 Id. 
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Justice Sotomayor’s enlightening concurrence in Jones expressed a more expansive 
approach to privacy issues.59  Sotomayor suggested that the government’s ability to obtain “at a 
relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person” 
required adapting and expanding the Katz expectation of privacy test.60  Sotomayor also 
questioned, and took on the continuing viability of, the third party doctrine; a theory many 
believe creates the largest gap in privacy protection, especially in the realm of technology.61  
Specifically, Sotomayor commented, “It may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties…This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of 
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People 
disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers; the URLs that they 
visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service providers…”62  
Condemning third party doctrine as applied to these technologies, she commented, “I for one 
doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the Government 
of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.”63  Unlike 
permissible third party search cases of the past, Sotomayor sought to emphasize the Court’s 
attention of the copious and unparalleled amounts of information individuals disclose to 
telecommunication companies and Internet service providers in the digital age. 
In contrast to every other Justice in Jones, Sotomayor reasoned that evolving digital 
technology had essentially changed the meaning of what “privacy” when myriads of personal 
                                                 
59 Shaff, supra at 432. 
60 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor concurring). See also Shaff, supra at 432-433. 
61 Richard M. Thompson II, United States v. Jones: GPS Monitoring, Property, and Privacy, 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ R42511.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). 
62 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
63 Id. 
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information and history can be preserved online, and can be easily collected by the government 
in mass quantities.64  Her lone approach focused on whether the government’s ability to collect 
so much personal information was enabling it to learn about a person's private affairs "more or 
less at will."65  More than simply a single concurrence, Sotomayor “penned a legal manifesto on 
privacy for a digital age debated among Fourth Amendment scholars and brandished by civil 
libertarians seeking to prevent the coming of a digital government panopticon.”66 
 
As the Kyllo and Jones decisions exhibited, the Supreme Court had begun to take on the 
task as to how the Fourth Amendment applies in the digital world.  Those cases also illustrated 
the difficulties the Court has in determining how developing technology changes Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights.67  In the subsequent years, the Court, and the legal community, has 
continued to attempt to answer questions such as whether Internet users have Fourth Amendment 
protection.  One such attempt has been recently made by Orin Kerr, a legal scholar and professor 
at George Washington University Law School.  Kerr’s theories have helped create a general 
framework that courts can utilize in applying Fourth Amendment safeguards and to determine 
unreasonable searches and seizures to the Internet.68 
Kerr’s approach addresses “the differences between the facts of physical space and the 
facts of the Internet” and establishes guidelines for courts to “identify new Fourth Amendment 
distinctions” in order to apply the amendment to a digital environment.”69  Cases like Olmstead, 
                                                 
64 Adam Serwer , How Sotomayor undermined Obama’s NSA, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-sotomayor-
undermined-obamas-nsa (last visited Oct. 14, 2015). 
65 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
66 Id. 
67 Shaff, supra at 425. 
68 Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1005, 1007 
(2010). 
69 Id. 
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Katz, Smith, and Jones all dealt with issues of whether the government’s surveillance was done 
“inside” or “outside” a constitutionally protected area.  As the aforementioned cases showed, in 
the physical world, the inside/outside distinction is paramount for Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure analysis.  Law enforcement, for example, must abide by the inside/outside distinction in 
the physical world to determine what types of surveillance can be done with, and without, a 
search warrant.70  As the Court in Katz held, the government does not need any probable cause or 
warrant to conduct surveillance outside.71  Hence, so long as a person’s conduct is out in the 
open, it is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.  Conversely, in most cases, Fourth 
Amendment safeguards are triggered when the government enters enclosed spaces like a home72, 
an automobile73, or a sealed package.74  So, albeit a few clear exceptions, a person presumptively 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in “inside spaces.”75   
In the physical world, the line between inside and outside is a crucial element in Fourth 
Amendment doctrine as it ensures a proper balance between necessary government 
investigations and personal privacy.76  In regards to the digital environment, however, there 
arguably is no “outside.”  Rather, everything about the Internet seems to be on the “inside” 
where it is packed into wires and storage devices.77  As a result, Kerr contends that when facts of 
criminal investigations switch to the Internet, the physical world “inside/outside distinction no 
                                                 
70 Id. at 1009. 
71 “Conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under 
the circumstances would be unreasonable.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
72 “The Fourth Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the very core stands the 
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Silverman 
v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). 
73 “Fourth Amendment provides protection to the owner of every container that conceals its contents from plain 
view,” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982). 
74 “Letters and other sealed packages are in the general class of effects in which the public at large has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy and warrantless searches of such effects are presumptively unreasonable.” United States v. 
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984). 
75 Kerr, supra at 1011. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 1012. 
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longer works.”78  Therefore, different rules need to apply; and as Kerr explains, the Internet 
consequently requires a separate distinction to “mirror the traditional physical distinction” 
established by the Supreme Court.79 
 Additionally, in the physical world, there is a limit on the scale and location of 
evidence.80  Physical evidence normally is limited to a specific location and, accordingly, Fourth 
Amendment law takes into account those limits.81  These evidence limits make sense in a 
physical world and over the years the Court has shaped the Fourth Amendment to coincide with 
them.  In the digital world, however, a very different dynamic exists.82  Unlike physical 
evidence, Internet data has no limitations on where it can exist or where it can be stored.  For 
example, a typical Internet user might have multiple e-mail accounts, several social media 
accounts, and several remote online storage accounts.83  The Fourth Amendment rules, therefore, 
that make sense for evidence in the physical world cannot adequately govern Internet evidence.  
New adapted rules are needed. Kerr suggests new rules in his approach to apply the Fourth 
Amendment to the Internet. 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1009. 
80 Id. at 1013. 
81 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (“It is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for 
and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into 
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like 
rule.”); See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (“Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's 
arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is 
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.”); See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 
294, 294-95 (1987) (“The area claimed to be curtilage is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed 
under the home's “umbrella” of protection: (1) the proximity of the area to the home; (2) whether the area is within 
an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature and uses to which the area is put; and (4) the steps taken *295 by 
the resident to protect the area from observation by passersby.”); See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (“the 
Fourth Amendment does not require the police traveling in the public airways at an altitude of 400 feet to obtain a 
warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked eye.”); See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) 
(“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical “intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a 
search—at least where the technology in question is not in general public use.”). 
82 Kerr, supra at 1014. 
83 Id.at 1015. 
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Attempting to translate and match Fourth Amendment established safeguards from the 
physical world (i.e. Katz, Jones) to the cyber world, Kerr’s approach hinges on one main 
concept.  Kerr proposes to replaces the inside/outside distinction of the physical world with a 
“content/non-content” distinction for the Internet.84  Referring to Katz, Kerr suggests that 
Internet users should also have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the “contents” of Internet 
communications but not in “non-content” information.85   By using narrow comparisons between 
the physical space and cyberspace, Kerr’s privacy application to the Internet articulates the 
distinction between Internet “content” and “non-content.”  Specifically, he suggests courts 
should utilize the physical world privacy language and treat Internet “non-content” information 
as if it was functionally on the “outside” and Internet “content” information as if it were 
functionally on the “inside.”86  Under this framework, Internet surveillance of non-content 
information would not trigger Fourth Amendment protections as physical world surveillance of 
outside places does not presumptively trigger Fourth Amendment protections.  Along these same 
lines, Internet surveillance of content information would trigger the Fourth Amendment just as 
physical world surveillance of inside places would presumptively trigger the Fourth 
Amendment.87  Therefore, based on Kerr’s privacy roadmap, it naturally follow that Internet 
inside content would be considered a search under the Fourth Amendment.  Conversely, Internet 
non-content would not be considered a search.   
According to Kerr, the content/non-content distinction mimics the inside/outside 
distinction to answer two key questions: 1. What is Internet content? and 2. What is Internet non-
content?  Just as outside surveillance in the physical world generally relate to identity, location, 
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and time, Internet non-content would also constitute surveillance related to identity, location, and 
time.88  Additionally, just as inside surveillance in the physical world would seek to gather a 
person’s “private thoughts,” Internet content surveillance would presumably convey a person’s 
“private thoughts and speech.”89 
 With a content/non-content framework in place for the Internet, the courts then would be 
tasked with drawing the line between the two to determine how the Fourth Amendment applies. 
Using an analogy for postal mail, Kerr further describes Internet non-content as addressing (or 
“envelope”) information and Internet content as what’s inside that “envelope”, e.g. the letter 
itself.90  Like postal mail, the Internet deals with the sending and delivering of information.  
Common examples are e-mail and instant messaging.  So, under Kerr’s content/non-content 
distinction, the non-content information would be the “to” and “from”, while content information 
would be the actual message itself.91  According to Kerr, Internet content should include “the 
substance of our thinking when we assume no else is around.”92  Moreover, it includes the 
aspects of Internet use intended to be “hidden from those other than the recipients” for a 
“specific person or even just to ourselves.”93  This vital distinction from non-content allows 
people to use the Internet for individual purposes or to communicate with others without 
government intrusion.   
 
The technology of the Internet is evolving at a rapid pace.  Despite this clear reality, the 
courts have yielded only a few decisions dealing with the Fourth Amendment as it applies to 
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Internet.  Relying on past case law and Professor Kerr’s rubric, the next question raised should 
be: “If Internet content triggers the Fourth Amendment, what exactly is Internet content?”   
The Supreme Court attempted to tackle the Internet content/non-content distinction in 
City of Ontario v. Quon.94  In this 2010 case, the Court set out to determine whether a California 
police department violated the constitutional rights of an employee when it inspected personal 
text messages sent and received by a city-owned pager. The case, which required familiarity with 
the technology behind pagers, produced questions at oral argument which showed a shocking 
lack of knowledge by the Justices in the area of the Internet.95   
Perhaps it was a lack of Internet expertise, but the Court in Quon never reached the 
narrow question of the appropriate level of Fourth Amendment protection for Internet content.96  
However, the Court did infer that a person does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
text messages, even though they could be accessed by a third party (i.e. ISP).97  But the Court’s 
hesitation in Quon to create an Internet content/non-content distinction for Fourth amendment 
analysis left the Internet privacy question unresolved.  In defense of the Court, this is a difficult 
issue for the Court to resolve as different Internet applications (i.e. email, instant messaging, 
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs)) are unique in their own way, so the content/non-content 
distinction therefore must also be unique for each specific mode of communication.  With issues 
unresolved, crucial questions remain open as to whether email subject lines, URLs, website IP 
addresses should be protected as content or treated as non-content (envelope) information.98  
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As a result of the Court’s reluctance to take on the Internet privacy issue, a major content 
vs. non-content controversy continues regarding the privacy interests of web surfing information 
(i.e. the IP addresses of websites and the URL addresses of the individual pages viewed.)99  
Supporters of broad privacy protection have expressed concern that URLs contain content and 
can reveal intimate personal information about web users.100  Others, conversely, interpret URLs 
and IP addresses as non-content and rely on the third party doctrine to argue that they are not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment, no matter what their content status.101  Most courts 
addressing the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the Internet have followed the holding 
in Smith to delineate a clear bright line between content and non-content data102  Subsequently, 
courts in the past have held that under third party doctrine, the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply to email addressing (envelope) information, such as IP and to/from addresses.103   
For example, the Ninth Circuit tackled the Internet privacy question in 2008.104  In that 
case, the court held that the government did not trigger the Fourth Amendment when it had a 
suspect’s Internet service provider install a monitoring device that recorded the IP address, 
to/from address for emails, and volume sent from the account.105  Notably, the court did 
comment on what it considered to be Internet content.  The Ninth Circuit tracked the reasoning 
in Smith and held that the Internet surveillance in that case was “indistinguishable” from the use 
of a pen register device in Smith.106  In regards to Fourth Amendment implications, the court 
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considered IP addresses to be the Internet equivalent of telephone numbers.  As a result, under 
Smith, IP addresses were considered non-content and not protected by the Fourth Amendment.107     
The Sixth Circuit, however, has applied a different Internet content/non-content 
distinction and has held that Internet e-mail receives Fourth Amendment protection just as 
telephone calls.108  The court explained that its holding was based on the current social role of 
Internet communications.109  Although the opinion was later vacated on other technical grounds, 
the Sixth Circuit did ultimately hold that a person “enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the contents of emails that are stored with, or sent or received through, a commercial ISP”110  
Therefore, under that rationale, the government cannot rely on the third-party doctrine from 
Smith and “may not compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber’s emails 
without first obtaining a warrant based on probable course.”111 
 
With the Circuit Courts divided, and the Supreme Court seemingly reluctant to solve the 
internet privacy question, Federal legislation concerning electronic surveillance is similarly 
inconsistent and lacking.  In response to Katz, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“Title III”).112  Because Title III covered only the 
interception of “wire” and “oral” communications rather than communications generally, the 
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development of electronic communications created a gap in the statute.  In 1986, Congress 
sought to fill this gap with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”). 113 
By supplementing Title III, Congress implemented the ECPA to protect privacy interests 
in the emerging realm of electronic communications.114 The ECPA was intended to extend 
privacy rights to e-mail as well as create new protections for stored communications and stored 
records held by third parties.115  At the time, many hailed the legislation as a victory for 
privacy.116  But the ECPA was written back in 1986, before most people had computers at home; 
before laptops, tablets and smartphones changed our lives; before social media and the World 
Wide Web; and before most people even used email.117  Within a matter of years, however, the 
Internet grew and the ECPA became the lone statutory framework for government surveillance 
of Internet communications.  In enacting the ECPA, Congress sought largely to align treatment 
of electronic communications with Title III’s treatment of wire communications.  But Congress 
clearly failed to anticipate that technological developments which ultimately placed so many 
electronic communications in the hands of third parties.118 
While the ECPA provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in some ways, 
it provides significant less protection in others.119  Whereas, under Smith, the Court afforded no 
Fourth Amendment protection for non-content, the ECPA does gives an Internet user some more 
privacy protection by requiring the government to first obtain a subpoena to obtain non-
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content.120  However, the ECPA provides less protection than the Fourth Amendment in several 
other scenarios.  Currently, under the ECPA, the government can access the following Internet 
communications without a warrant: emails older than 6 months, digital address books and 
calendars, direct Twitter messages older than 6 months, cloud storage documents, Facebook 
messages and comments older than 6 months, private Facebook and Instagram photos, text 
message older than 6 months, Dropbox accounts, and search queries.121  Many in the legal 
community find the ECPA to be overly outdated because, back in 1986 , email service providers 
did not store emails for very long after they were sent and read.122  In 1986, it was practically 
inconceivable that a service provider would store email for more than 180 days. Therefore, 
ECPA treated older email almost as if it were abandoned property, allowing a government 
official to demand it from the service provider with a subpoena issued without a judge’s 
approval.   
 
The degree to which the Internet receives Fourth Amendment provides protection 
remains an “open question” as “electronic communication via e-mails, text messages, and other 
means opens a new frontier in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that has been little explored.”123  
With technological development seemingly outpacing judicial review and federal legislation, the 
question as to whether a person has a reasonable expectation when using the Internet becomes 
more pressing with each passing day.   
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Last year, the Supreme Court moved Fourth Amendment doctrine a bit forward with 
respect to cell phones, which are increasingly the primary way in which people access the 
Internet.  In Riley v California,124 the Court addressed the scope of the search-incident-to-a-
lawful arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.  The Court 
unanimously held that the search of digital content of cell (smart) phones does not fall within the 
exception and, absent a warrant, any search would be unconstitutional.125  The Court reasoned 
that cell phones “differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense” from other physical items 
that are searchable incident to arrest.126  Given their “immense storage capacity,” Chief Justice 
Roberts commented in the majority opinion that cellphones “could just as easily be called 
cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, 
televisions, maps, or newspapers.”127 
The Court’s decision in Riley represents an important, albeit minor, development for 
Internet privacy rights.  While only in the narrow context of searches incident to arrest, the Court 
moved the Fourth Amendment further into the digital world by addressing new privacy 
challenges presented by technological developments.128 The holding requires a warrant to search 
any data on a cell phone, regardless of whether that data is saved in the cloud (i.e. in online 
servers managed by a hosting company), or on the phone’s internal hard drive.129  However, 
outside of the search incident to an arrest context, the Court did not address whether information 
stored in the cloud is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.130  The Court in fact went out of 
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its way to clarify that Riley did “not implicate the question of whether the collection or 
inspection of...digital information amounts to a search under other circumstances.”131  
Nonetheless, the decision in Riley, while narrow in context, signals a potential shift in the 
Court’s stance on third-party doctrine.  Notably, Riley acknowledged the Court’s concerns with 
the evolving technological landscape we live in as well as sensitivity towards user content and 
privacy.      
Additional discussion regarding third party doctrine in the digital age took place recently 
in the DC Circuit.  In Klayman vs Obama,132 a federal district court addressed the Government’s 
bulk collection of telephone metadata (i.e. phone numbers dialed, date, and duration).  The court 
distinguished Smith and found that third party doctrine did not preclude Fourth Amendment 
application.  In its finding that a national security surveillance program constituted a warrantless 
search, the DC Circuit concluded that the circumstances in Klayman was a “far cry” from the 
analysis in Smith.133  
Although the telephone data collected in Klayman was considered “non-content,” the 
Klayman court emphasized the quantity and quality of the information collected in determining 
that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed.134  Specifically, the court in Klayman found 
several differences from Smith in reaching its conclusion that a Fourth Amendment violation 
took place.  For example, unlike in Smith where one specific phone number was monitored, 
Klayman implicated the telephone transactions for millions of U.S. citizens135  Also, the 
government’s collection of metadata in Smith stemmed from an ongoing criminal investigation.  
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In Klayman, however, the government, as part of its broad counterterrorism investigation, 
monitored citizens “without any particularized suspicion of wrongdoing.”136  Additionally, the 
pen register in Smith was utilized for 2 weeks.  The surveillance at issue in Klayman, however, 
involved the collection of five years worth of data.137  In this regard, the court in Klayman added 
that while metadata has not changed over time, the “ubiquity of phones has dramatically altered 
the quantity of information that is now available and, more importantly, what that information 
can tell the Government about people’s lives.”138  Here, the court addressed the non-content vs 
content distinction and held that “people in 2013” had “an entirely different relationship with 
phone” than those that lived back during the Smith case.  The Klayman court suggested over the 
course of five years, the content/non-content distinction begins to break down.139  In other words, 
if the government can collect enough non-content (e.g. metadata), content can ultimately be 
derived from it. 
While the decision in Klayman was recently vacated due to a standing issue, the case has 
significantly furthered the dialogue of the privacy rights in the digital age.  Klayman called upon 
the Supreme Court to reread Smith and reconsider third party doctrine by factoring in “present 
day circumstances,” “the evolution of the government’s surveillance capabilities,” and “citizens’ 
phone habits.”140  To that end, in considering Klayman, the Court should conclude that the 
precedent in Smith can no longer apply.141  Although Klayman addressed privacy rights solely in 
the context of telephone use, perspectives from that case support a vision of the Fourth 
Amendment being sensitive both to technological change and to context.  Based on the rapidly 
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expanding change in the digital world, the analysis in Klayman should ultimately extend to 
Internet privacy rights as well.   
The Internet privacy right issue has recently fueled an emerging debate over encryption.  
Specifically, in response to demands from Internet users requesting higher levels of privacy and 
security, companies like Google and Apple have been rolling out stronger “end-to-end” 
encryption on their devices and services, such as iPhones and Gmail.142  End-to-end encryption is 
a method of digital communication where the only the sender and recipient of a message have 
access to it.  The “end-to-end” promise means that messages are encrypted in such a way that 
allows only the unique recipient of a message to decrypt it, and not anyone in between, not even 
the Internet providers, i.e. Google and Apple.143 
The encryption methods implemented by companies like Google and Apple have 
arguably created a reasonable expectation of privacy for users of the Internet.  Encryption offers 
a much needed protection for users as their smartphones have become the modern day equivalent 
of “digital homes.”144  This added privacy protection has gotten the attention of FBI and the 
Department.  Specifically, in the name of criminal and national security investigations, these 
government agencies have insisted that Google and Apple need to provide them with “back 
doors” to access private Internet communications.145   
Providing backdoors to the government, however, as privacy and cryptology experts have 
maintained, would be impossible without compromising the security of computer systems and 
opening holes for criminals to exploit.    Nonetheless, the FBI and DOJ continue to put pressure 
                                                 
142 Jenna McLaughlin, FBI and DOJ Target New Enemy In Crypto Wars: Apple and Google, (July 8, 2015 2:10 
PM), https://theintercept.com/2015/07/08/fbi-doj-name-new-enemy-crypto-wars-apple-google/ 
143 Andy Greenberg, Hacker Lexicon: What is End-to-End Encryption?, (Nov. 25, 2014 9:00 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/2014/11/hacker-lexicon-end-to-end-encryption/ 
144 Wayne Rash, FBI Director Ignores 4th Amendment in Call for Encryption ‘Back Doors’, (Oct. 16, 2014), 
http://www.eweek.com/print/security/fbi-director-ignores-4th-amendment-in-call-for-encryption-back-doors.html 
145 McLaughlin, supra note 3. 
27 
 
on companies like Apple and Google to comply with their requests.  The agencies contend that 
end-to-end encryption poses an “every day” problem and an “insurmountable barrier” in 
conducting surveillance.  Yet according to a Federal Courts report on wiretapping in 2014, state 
and federal law enforcement encountered only four cases all year (out of 3,554) in which 
wiretaps were ineffective because of encryption.146  While it’s fair to acknowledge that, due to 
encryption, the FBI and DOJ may have a diminished capacity to conduct some investigations, 
it’s also fair to recognize that, at some point, an appropriate balance between safety, privacy, and 
liberty must be struck. 
As this paper is being written, Internet privacy rights are far from secure.  The challenges 
posed by the intersection of the Fourth Amendment, Federal legislation, and Internet surveillance 
are not easy ones.  The constitutional and statutory frameworks governing electronic surveillance 
law developed at a time when electronic communications either did not exist or were not widely 
used.147  The Internet and other technological developments have subsequently placed 
tremendous strain on those frameworks.148  The essential elements of ECPA have not changed 
since 1986, and the Supreme Court has failed to keep pace, saying remarkably little about the 
Fourth Amendment’s application to new technology.149  Hence, the government can contend the 
ECPA gives it the authority to ignore Internet privacy to an extent that would have “shocked the 
framers of the Constitution.”150 
While there is still significant work to be done, some progress has been made.  Building 
on the decisions in Katz, Smith, and Kyllo, recent cases like Jones and Riley have produced some 
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clarification in the balance between electronic surveillance and privacy.  Despite their differing 
ideologies, Justices Scalia and Sotomayor have furthered the discussion in their own way to 
frame the rules of searches and third-party doctrine; and to further clarify standards for 
“reasonableness” and “expectation of privacy.”  Similarly, scholars like Orin Kerr have 
contributed by offering theories to adapt and modernize legal doctrine into the world of the 
Internet and new technologies.  Moreover, companies like Apple and Google have entered into 
the Internet privacy fray by instituting encryption protection for their customers.  In the end, time 
will tell as to whether the Supreme Court and Congress can strike a fair and appropriate balance 
between Internet privacy rights and transparency.   
